Title: Contiguity and the Non-Human in Spinozist Social Individuals
Abstract: Spinoza defines bodily individuals in the well-known physical digression of Ethics II. It is clear that, in some sense, human bodies constitute bodily individuals. But interpreters have historically diverged on whether groups of humans could together form similarly robust bodily individuals. For realists, social individuals are individuals in exactly the same way as particular humans are. This contrasts with the now less common anti-realist readers, who do not think social groups, communities, or states can be individuals in the same sense as particular humans. In this paper, I explain the realist view and then make two important contributions to it: first, contrary to many realist readings, I argue that Spinozist social bodies must not merely have parts which communicate their motions, but also must be literally physically contiguous. This is true despite it seeming odd to consider, say, a nation state or community as physically contiguous. Second, because contiguous social bodies will include non-human bodies, it follows that non-human bodies are interesting and important parts of the actions of social individuals themselves. After arguing these two points, I finish by anticipating objections.
Sponsored by The Edward J. and Dorothy Clarke Kempf Fund at Yale University.
