Title: "Heidegger and the Problem of Metaphysics as Ontotheology"
Abstract: Heidegger characterizes both the history and the essence of metaphysics as “ontotheological.” By “ontotheology,” he does not mean a branch of transcendental theology that tries to demonstrate God’s existence through concepts alone. Instead, he means an approach to being that concentrates on the being of entities, conceiving of it either as itself an entity or exclusively in terms of entities. In his own philosophy, Heidegger often speaks of an ontological difference, but what interests him is not simply the difference between entities and their being but what makes this difference possible. Notoriously, Heidegger accuses the entire philosophical tradition of neglecting this non-ontotheological, enabling condition. In my lecture, I will reconstruct and critique Heidegger’s influential conception of metaphysics as ontotheology. First, I will examine the broader problem of metaphysics in his corpus, demonstrating how ontotheology becomes its focal meaning. Paying particular attention to Heidegger’s engagements with Aristotle and Hegel, I will then trace a genealogy of his conception of ontotheology. Next, I will use this genealogy to define ontotheology and delineate its various dimensions. Finally, I will challenge the term’s internal coherence and external applicability, arguing that its utility depends on significantly narrowing its sense and scope.
