Title: "Descartes' Concept of Substance: Some Problems."
Abstract: It has often been argued that Descartes’ definition of substance precludes the possibility of the causal dependence of one substance on another (e.g., the causal dependence of created minds and bodies on God), thereby paving the way to substance monism. More recently, it has been argued that the concept of dependence in Descartes’ definition of substance includes only ontological, not causal dependence. What matters, on this interpretation, is whether it is in the nature or essence of the relevant entity to inhere in another, not whether it be caused by another. I shall argue that, even when causal considerations are cast aside, the nature or essence of finite substances (qua finite) cannot be understood independently of infinite substance (God), which, according to Descartes’ theory of distinctions, entails that created minds are bodies are modes, not substances. This flagrantly contradicts Descartes’ ontology of infinite substance, according to which God can have no modes. The aporetic legacy of Descartes’ concept of substance helps explain the development of early modern metaphysics after Descartes.
Sponsored by The Edward J. and Dorothy Clarke Kempf Fund at Yale University.
